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1. Introduction 
The Logic of Collective Action1 has for decades supplied the logic 
of public policy analysis. In this pioneering application of public choice 
theory, Mancur Olson elegantly punctured the premise — shared by a 
diverse variety of political theories — that individuals can be expected to 
act consistently with the interest of the groups to which they belong. Ab-
sent externally imposed incentives, wealth-maximizing individuals, he ar-
gued, will rarely find it in their interest to contribute to goods that benefit 
the group as a whole, but rather will “free ride” on the contributions that 
other group members make. As a result, too few individuals will contrib-
ute sufficiently, and the well-being of the group will suffer.2 These are 
the assumptions that dominate public policy analysis and ultimately public 
policy across a host of regulatory domains — from tax collection to envi-
ronmental conservation, from street-level policing to policing of the inter-
net. 
But as a wealth of social science evidence (much of it appearing 
elsewhere in this volume) now makes clear, Olson’s Logic is false. In 
collective action settings, individuals adopt not a materially calcula ting 
posture but rather in a richer, more emotionally nuanced reciprocal one. 
When they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals 
are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public 
goods even without the inducement of material incentives. When, in con-
trast, they perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage 
of them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to retaliate. In 
that circumstance, they will withhold beneficial forms of cooperation even 
if doing so exposes them to significant material disadvantage.3 
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1 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965). 
2 See id. at 1-2. 
3 See Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, An Empirical and 
Analytical Examination of the Moral Sentiments, chapter 1 of this volume; Ernst Fehr & 
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This behaviorally realistic picture of human motivation suggests not 
only an alternative account of when collective action problems will arise, 
but also an alternative program for solving (or simply avoiding) them 
through law. Whereas the conventional logic of collective action counsels 
the creation of appropriate external incentives, the new logic of reciproc-
ity suggests the importance of promoting trust. Individuals who have faith 
in the willingness of others to contribute their fair share will voluntarily 
respond in kind. Spontaneous cooperation of this sort, moreover, breeds 
even more of the same, as individuals observe others contributing to pub-
lic goods and are moved to reciprocate. In this self-sustaining atmosphere 
of trust, reliance on costly incentive schemes becomes less necessary. By 
the same token, individuals who lack faith in their fellows can be ex-
pected to resist contributing to public goods, inducing still others to with-
hold their cooperation as a means of retaliating. In this self-sustaining at-
mosphere of distrust, even strong (and costly) regulatory incentives are 
likely to be ineffective in promoting desirable behavior. 
Indeed, such incentives may well undermine the conditions of trust 
necessary to hold collective action problems in check. Conspicuous re-
wards and punishments can imply that others aren’t inclined to cooperate 
voluntarily, a message that predictably weakens individuals’ commitment 
to contributing to public goods. In addition, incentive schemes tend to 
mask the extent to which individuals are inclined to contribute to public 
goods voluntarily, thereby weakening the tendency of observable coop-
eration to generate reciprocal cooperation by others. In short, manipula t-
ing material incentives may not only be an inefficient regulatory strategy 
for solving collective action problems; it may often be a self-defeating 
one. 
This chapter will elaborate upon and apply these claims. It begins by 
distilling from the reciprocity literature a set of behavioral dynamics perti-
nent societal collective action problems. It then shows how these dynam-
ics can be used to analyze and improve policymaking in various regulatory 
fields, with a particular emphasis on tax compliance, the siting of noxious 
facilities, and the policing of street crime. 
2. The Logic of Reciprocity 
Accepted for decades on a combination of faith and anecdote, the 
premises of the conventional theory of collective action have only re-
cently been subjected to sustained and rigorous empirical examination. 












from the conventional position in four important respects, each of which 
merits specific attention. 





Wealth maximizers Emotional/moral reciprocators




Two Theories of Collective Action
 
Agents: Wealth Maximizers vs. Emotional/Moral Reciprocators 
The first pair of contrasting elements relates to the nature of indi-
viduals’ utility functions. The conventional theory assumes that individuals 
in collective action settings — ones that take the form of a standard pris-
oners’ dilemma — behave like wealth maximizers. That is, they refuse to 
contribute to collective goods and instead free-ride on the contributions 
made by others, who, as wealth maximizers, also contribute nothing. The 
reciprocity model, in contrast, sees individuals as moral and emotional 
reciprocators. Most persons think of themselves and want to be under-
stood by others as cooperative and trustworthy and are thus perfectly 
willing to contribute their fair share to securing collective goods. But by 
the same token, most individuals are loath to being taken advantage of. 
Accordingly, if they perceive that most other individuals are shirking, they 
hold back too to avoid feeling exploited. 
The reciprocity theory’s view of individual motivations is supported 
by a vast body of evidence. Much of it is experimental in nature. So-
called “public goods” experiments — laboratory constructs designed to 
simulate collective action problems — have consistently shown that the 












is highly conditional on their perception that others are willing to do so.4 
Empirical studies of real-world behavior corroborate this finding. Indi-
viduals have been shown, for example, to reciprocate the disposition of 
others to give (or not) to charity,5 to refrain (or not) from littering,6 and to 
wait their turn (or not) in lines.7 Indeed, individuals behave like reciproca-
tors even in markets: econometric and other forms of field research, for 
example, suggest that when firms compensate their workers more gener-
ously workers reciprocate by voluntarily working harder.8 
Collective Behavior: Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria 
The second pair of contrasts concerns collective behavior. In typical 
collective action settings, the conventional theory treats defection or free-
riding as the dominant strategy for every individual. Accordingly, that the-
ory predicts a single collective behavioral equilibrium: universal noncoop-
eration. 
Under the reciprocity theory, in contrast, there is no “dominant” in-
dividual strategy. Individuals prefer to contribute if they believe others are 
inclined to contribute, but to free-ride if they believe that others are in-
clined to free-ride. 
                                                 
4 See Fehr & Gächter, supra note 3.  
5 See Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Request 
to Donate Money, 67 J. Applied Psy. 110 (1982); see also Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: 
Science and Practice 96-97 (describing techniques used to create impressions of wide-
spread charitable giving) (3d ed. 1993). 
6 See Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal 29-30 (7th ed. 1995); Robert B. Cialdini, Ray-
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Bernd Schmitt, Laurette Dubé, France Leclerc, Intrusions into Waiting Lines: Does the 
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Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination, NBER Working Paper 
No. 2271, at 25-26 (1987); Lawrence Katz & Lawrence Summers, Industry Rents: Evi-
dence and Implications, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 209 
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Such interdependencies tend to generate patterns of collective be-
havior characterized by multiple equilibria punctuated by tipping 
points.9 If, for whatever reason, some individuals conclude that those 
around them are inclined to contribute, they’ll respond by contributing in 
kind, prompting still others to contribute, and so forth and so on until a 
                                                 
9 These patterns can be illustrated graphically. 
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In this particular representation, there are three equilibria. One (selected arbitrarily for 
illustration) is around 50%: if participants in a collective action setting perceive that about 
half of the other participants are contributing in the period tn , then about half will choose 
to contribute in the period tn+1, which means that about that many will contribute in the 
period tn+2, and so forth and so on. But this middle equilibrium is relatively unstable. If as 
a result of some exogenous shock, more than 50% are induced to contribute in tn (say, 
60%), then an even higher percentage than that will be willing to contribute in tn+1 (70%), 
leading a still higher percentage in tn+2, and so forth and so on until contribution levels top 
out at the high-cooperation equilibrium at the upper right hand corner. Similarly, if for 
some reason less than 50% contribute in tn (say, 40%), then an even smaller percentage 
will contribute in tn+1 (30%), leading to an lower contribution level in tn+2, and so forth and 
so on until contributions bottom out at the low-cooperation equilibrium on the lower left 
hand corner. The corner equilibria, moreover, are relatively stable: exogenous shocks may 
result in temporary boosts or drops in contributions but unless they are big enough to 
push the contribution level back across the 50% tipping point, collective behavior will 
quickly settle back into the corner equilibrium from which it started. See generally Tho-
mas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978) (developing formal model of 
tipping points and feedback effects); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex 














highly cooperative state of affairs takes root. But if some individuals con-
clude that others are free-riding, then they will respond by free-riding, too, 
spurring others to do the same, and so forth and so on until a condition of 
mass noncooperation becomes the norm. 
This dynamic, too, has been empirically documented. In multi-round 
public good experiments, for example, contribution levels tends to migrate 
steadily toward or away from the social optimum depending on whether 
subjects behaved relatively cooperative or noncooperatively early on.10 
Scholars have also documented that the incidence of littering, recycling, 
smoking in public, safe sex, and other types of behavior that affect collec-
tive welfare are likewise subject to feedback effects and multiple equilib-
ria — generating dramatic variations in their incidence across space and 
over time.11  
Promoting Cooperation: Incentives vs. Trust 
The third contrast has to do with policy prescriptions. The conven-
tional theory sees incentives as the solution to collective action problems: 
because wealth maximizers can’t be counted on to contribute to public 
goods, they must be prodded to do so with either rewards or punishments 
that bring their individual interests into alignment with their collective 
ones. 
The reciprocity theory suggests an alternative policy, viz., the pro-
motion of trust. If they can be made to believe that others are inclined to 
contribute to public goods, then individuals can be induced to contribute in 
turn, even without recourse to incentives. When permitted to communi-
cate during play, for example, subjects in multi-round public goods ex-
periments tend to assure one another that they’ll contribute rather than 
free-ride. Although unenforceable, such assurances do in fact prompt 
larger contributions, which subjects quickly increase toward the social 
optimum as they observe others doing the same.12 Face-to-face assur-
ance-giving, in sum, conduces to trust, which in turn generates reciprocal 
cooperation. 
                                                 
10 See generally Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher, Modeling Strong Reciprocity, Chapter 
6 of this volume. 
11 See, e.g.,, Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947, 
976-77 (1997); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regula-
tion, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 688-89, 746 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Func-
tion of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2032-36 (1996). 
12 See Ledyard, supra note 10, at 156-68; Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the 












Indeed, field and laboratory research suggests that incentives, far 
from solving collective action problems, can sometimes actually magnify 
them by dissipating trust. The simple existence of an incentive scheme 
can be seen as a cue that other individuals are not inclined to cooperate 
voluntarily: if they were, incentives would be unnecessary. This inference 
can in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to withhold voluntary coopera-
tion thereby undercutting, if not wholly displacing, the force of the incen-
tive. In addition, the existence of incentives can mask voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods, thereby diluting the power of such contributions to 
trigger reciprocal cooperation. Relatedly, incentives can crowd out dispo-
sitions such as altruism by extinguishing the opportunity of individuals to 
demonstrate (to themselves and to others) that they are willing to sacri-
fice material gain for the public good. And if for any of these reasons, the 
advent of a material incentive for this reason induces even a few indi-
viduals to contribute less to a public good, moreover, reciprocity dynamics 
will induce still others to contribute less, thereby inducing others to do the 
same, and so forth and so on until collective behavior settles into a new, 
noncooperative equilibrium — one that is likely to be impervious to the 
subsequent removal of material incentives.13 
It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that material incentives 
invariably diminish trust. They are most likely to have that effect, re-
search suggests, when individuals start out with the belief that most other 
individuals are inclined to contribute to some public good voluntarily; 
that’s when the advent of material incentives creates the greatest risk of 
adverse cueing, masking, and crowding out. But things are likely to be 
different if individuals start out with the belief that most other individuals 
are inclined to shirk or free-ride. In that case, the advent of a credible 
reward or penalty can work — not just by changing individuals material 
incentives but by changing in a positive way their impression of the will-
ingness of other individuals to behave cooperatively rather than noncoop-
eratively in a collective action setting. 
                                                 
13 See Elinor Ostrom, Policies that Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action, Chapter 
9 of this volume. See generally Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic 
Theory of Personal Motivation (1997); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 
29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000) (finding that fine increased rather than decreased abuse of day 
care center rules by parents); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at 
All (unpublished manuscript, April 1999) (finding that incentives decreased rather than 
increased performance of individuals soliciting charitable donations); Richard M. Titmuss, 
The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1971) (finding incentives 
suppress donation of blood); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: 












An example is the power of higher-than-average wages to elicit 
higher-than-average productivity in the workplace. Workers naturally 
suspect their firms of being unwilling to share a fair portion of the surplus 
generated by the workers’ labor. But when a firm offers workers a wage 
that exceeds the industry average, workers are likely to infer that that 
particular firm is willing to divide the surplus fairly; they therefore re-
spond by voluntarily working more productively, which inclines firms to 
maintain or even raise their wages. The result is a self-sustaining form of 
reciprocal cooperation that obviates the need for costly performance 
monitoring regimes. 
Variability of Preferences: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous 
Finally, the conventional theory and the reciprocity theory differ on 
the variability of preferences across individuals. The conventional theory 
imagines that the disposition to free-ride in collective action settings is 
relatively uniform. In contrast, the evidence on which the reciprocity the-
ory rests suggests that the disposition to cooperate varies. In public goods 
experiments that generate multiple equilibria, for example, neither univer-
sal cooperation nor universal defection is the final resting point. 
It makes more sense, then, to envision a distribution of cooperative 
dispositions across the population. 











Heterogeneity of Collective Action Dispositions












those who’ve been trained in neo-classical economics) consists of com-
mitted free-riders, who shirk no matter what anyone else does, and an-
other small fraction (maybe those who’ve read too much Kantian moral 
philosophy) of dedicated cooperators, who contribute no matter what. But 
most individuals are reciprocators, who cooperate conditionally on the 
willingness of others to contribute. Moreover, some reciprocators are 
relatively intolerant: they bolt as soon as they observe anyone else free-
riding. Others are relatively tolerant, continuing to contribute even in the 
face of what they see as a relatively modest degree of defection. And a 
great many more — call them the neutral reciprocators — fall some-
where in between. 
Under these circumstances, individuals are unlikely fully to over-
come collective action problems through reciprocity dynamics alone. No 
matter how cooperative the behavior of others, the committed free-riders 
will always free-ride if they can get away with it. Indeed, their shirking 
could easily provoke non-cooperative behavior by the less tolerant recip-
rocators, whose defection in turn risks inducing the neutral reciprocators 
to abandon ship, thereby prompting even the tolerant reciprocators to 
throw in the towel, and so forth and so on. If this unfortunate chain reac-
tion takes place, a state of affairs once characterized by a reasonably 
high degree of cooperation could tip decisively toward a noncooperative 
equilibrium in which only the angelic, Kantian, unconditional cooperators 
are left contributing (probably futilely) to the relevant public good. 
Maximum cooperation, then, probably requires that reciprocity dy-
namics be supplemented with appropriately tailored incentives, most 
likely in the form of penalties aimed specifically at persistent free-riders. 
Although trust and reciprocity elicit cooperation from most players, some 
coercive mechanism remains necessary for the small population of dedi-
cated free-riders, who continue to hold out in the face of widespread 
spontaneous cooperation, thereby depressing the contributions made by 
some, relatively unforgiving reciprocators. In the face of a credible pen-
alty, however, the committed free-riders fall into line. The existence of 
such penalties in turn assures the less tole rant reciprocators that their co-
operation won’t make them into chumps; they thus continue to cooperate, 
less out of material interest than out of positive reciprocal motivations. 
And because the less tolerant reciprocators contribute, so do the neutral 
and tolerant reciprocators, generating an equilibrium of near-universal 












particularly ones that allow subjects in public goods experiments to retali-
ate against defectors.14 
The uneven effect of penalties in promoting and dissipating trust 
calls attention to the expressive dimension of incentives. Incentives do 
more than affect individuals’ calculations of the costs and benefits of par-
ticular forms of conduct; they also shape their impressions of the attitudes 
and intentions of those around them.15 Laboratory and real-world 
schemes that use generally applicable incentives convey the message 
that noncooperation is the norm, and thus stifle the reciprocal motivations 
of even neutral reciprocators, whose defection predictably spills over onto 
even the most forgiving ones. Targeted retaliation, in contrast, conveys a 
very different message. Because all individuals are aware from social 
experience that there are some committed free-riders out there, no one is 
surprised or disappointed to see penalties aimed at those types; accord-
ingly, such penalties don’t create the cueing, masking, or crowding out 
effects associated with more generalized incentive regimes. On the con-
trary, penalties understood to be necessitated only by the existence of 
committed free-riders have a trust-enhancing effect, for they imply that 
most individuals are not inclined to shirk. Targeted retaliation works, in 
sum, because it simultaneously coerces dedicated free-riders, calms un-
forgiving reciprocators, and avoids confusing or demoralizing neutral and 
forgiving reciprocators. 
3. Tax Compliance 
Tax compliance is the consummate collective action from a public 
policy point of view. Society collects taxes to finance a variety of goods 
— from education to highways to national defense — that benefit its 
members collectively. Nevertheless, it is in the individual material interest 
of every citizen to free-ride on her fellow citizens’ contributions to these 
goods while withholding any contribution of her own. Accordingly, the 
conventional theory predicts that individuals, as wealth maximizers, will 
evade their taxes, unless furnished with incentives — in the form of 
                                                 
14 See Gintis, et al., chapter 1 of this volume; Fehr & Fischbacherm chapter 5 of this 
volume; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Ex-
periments, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 980 (2000). 
15 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. 












threatened penalties — that make the expected return from evasion 
smaller than the expected return from compliance.16 
This account of tax evasion is embarrassingly ill-supported by em-
pirical evidence. Econometric studies have concluded that the expected 
penalty for evasion explains little if any of the variation in compliance 
across space or over time.17 Survey measures also find only very modest 
correlation between reported compliance and individuals’ subjective per-
ception of the expected penalty for evasion.18 Finally, laboratory experi-
ments that simulate the decision to evade suggest that probability and se-
verity of detection can influence individual decisions to evade, but only 
when they are set at levels far in excess of those associated with actual 
policies.19 
What explains a lot more, empirical research suggests, is a complex 
of factual beliefs and emotional dispositions. Thus, an individual’s percep-
tion of the extent of evasion is a powerful predictor of compliance behav-
ior: the higher an individual believes the rate of tax-cheating to be, the 
more likely he or she is to cheat too.20 So too are the prospect of shame 
(or potential stigma) and guilt. The more likely an individual believes it is 
that she will be condemned by others should she be caught, the more 
likely she is to refrain from evading. By the same token, the more regret 
                                                 
16 See generally Micale G Allingham & Agnar Sandomo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theo-
retical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972). 
17 See id. at 842; Frank A. Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion 
74 (1990); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implica-
tions for Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 Taxpayer Compliance 126, 142 (J. Roth 
and J. T. Scholz ed., 1989). 
18 See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of 
Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. Econ. Psych. 213, 225 & 
226 tbl. 2 (1982). 
19 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. 
Lit. 818, 841 (1998). 
20 See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, 
in 2 Taxpayer Compliance 215 (J. A. Roth and J. T. Scholz ed., 1989); James P.F. 
Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputations Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 
Euro. Econ. Rev. 797 (1989); Klepper & Nagin, supra note 17, at 144; Steven M. Sheffrin 
& Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Tax-












or remorse that an individual believes she’d experience for engaging in 
evasion, the less likely she is to engage in that crime.21 
These are exactly the factors one would expect to influence tax 
compliance were individuals behaving like moral and emotional reciproca-
tors. A strong reciprocator wants to understand herself and be under-
stood by others as fair, but she loathes being taken advantage of. With 
tax collection as with other collective action settings, the extent to which 
others appear to be contributing to the good in question determines which 
of these sensibilities comes into play. If most other individuals seem to be 
paying their taxes, then evasion will provoke either guilt, shame, or both in 
the reciprocator who covets the respect of others and of himself. If, in 
contrast, most individuals appear to be evading, then complying won’t 
make her feel guilty or ashamed at all; it will make her feel like a sucker. 
This interpretation of the data is confirmed by an experiment that 
tested how the 1986 Tax Reform Act affected compliance levels.22 One 
hypothesis, suggested by the conventional theory, was that individuals 
would become more or less willing to evade depending on whether the 
Act had increased or decreased their relative tax burden. The study 
found no such correlation. What did shift patterns of compliance, the re-
searchers found, were the types of interactions that individuals had with 
other taxpayers in the months leading up to the reform: those who en-
countered others who expressed a positive attitude toward, and commit-
ment to complying with, the Tax Reform Act displayed greater commit-
ment to complying with it themselves, whereas those who encountered 
others who expressed negative attitudes displayed less commitment.23 
This effect, moreover, was explained completely by variation in the 
shame and guilt that the two groups of taxpayers anticipated for failing to 
pay their taxes.24 In other words, as moral and emotional reciprocators, 
these individuals naturally felt guilt and shame for failing to contribute to 
the public good of tax compliance in proportion to their perception that 
others were or were not contributing. 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Grasmick & Scott, supra note 18, at 226 & tbl. 4; Wilbur J. Scott & Harold 
G. Grasmick, Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in 
Utilitarian Theories, 17 J. Applied Behavioral Sci. 395, 403 tbl. 1 (1981). 
22 Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen M. McGraw, & John T. Scholz, Taxpayer Adapta-
tion to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think 
About Taxes?, in Why People Pay Taxes 9 (Joel Slemrod ed. 1992). 
23 See id. at 29-30. 












The conventional theory of collective action is just as weak at ex-
plaining variance in tax compliance across nations as it is in explaining 
compliance across individuals. Tax compliance rates vary dramatically 
across nations. Essentially none of this variance, however, can be ex-
plained by differences in the expected penalty for evasion. More impor-
tant, researchers have concluded, are differences in public attitudes to-
ward tax laws. In some nations (including the United States), individuals 
tend to view paying their taxes as an important civic obligation, and are 
highly motivated to pay for that reason. In other nations (including many 
in Western Europe), individuals regard tax obligations much more casually 
(akin, say, to traffic regulations in the United States), and display no par-
ticular moral aversion to evading them if they feel they can safely do 
so.25 
Varying national “tax cultures” of this sort are perfectly understand-
able under the reciprocity theory. Because individuals are reciprocators, 
their decisions in a collective action setting feed on and reinforce each 
other, generating multiple high- and low-cooperation equilibria independ-
ent of the material payoffs associated with cooperating or defecting. If 
individuals believe that those around them are inclined to pay their taxes, 
they will (as a result of guilt, shame, pride and the like) be more likely to 
comply, thereby strengthening the perception that individuals are generally 
inclined to pay. If, in contrast, individuals believe that those around them 
are inclined to evade, resentment will inhibit them from complying, 
strengthening the perception that most individuals are inclined to cheat. In 
other words, what we should expect to see under the reciprocity theory is 
exactly what we do see — viz., competing and relatively durable norms 
toward tax compliance.26 
The empirical evidence also bears out the trust theory’s anxiety 
about the effect of self-defeating material incentives. Experimental evi-
dence suggests that when taxpayers are exposed to information highlight-
ing the penalties for evasion, they respond in much the same way that 
subjects in public goods experiments do when furnished with generalized 
                                                 
25 See James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana De Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors 
in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995); Cowell, supra note 17, at 102-03. 
26 See Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Percep-
tions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193, 194-95 (J. 
Slemrod ed., 1992) (suggesting interdependence of taxpayer decisionmaking should gener-
ate multiple behavioral equilibria); see also Cowell, supra note 17, 112-13 (developing 
theoretical model predicting multiple compliance equilibria based on interdependence of 












material incentives to contribute — namely, by contributing less.27 Re-
searchers have also found that the highly politicized auditing campaigns 
tend to provoke a higher incidence of tax cheating rather than a lower 
one.28 
The mechanism for these effects appears to be social cueing. When 
government engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals aware that 
the penalties for tax evasion are being increased, it also causes individuals 
to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are choosing to cheat. This 
distrust of one’s neighbors triggers a reciprocal motive to evade, which 
dominates the greater material incentive to comply associated with the 
higher than expected penalty.29 
Is there a way for tax enforcers to bolster taxpayers’ trust in one 
another? One policy that seems to do that is simply to advise citizens that 
the vast majority of taxpayers are in fact complying. In a study sponsored 
by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, researchers sent letters to a 
group of individuals stating that tax compliance rates were in fact much 
higher than what public opinion polls suggested citizens believed them to 
be. Those individuals thereafter reported more income and claimed fewer 
deductions than did individuals in a control group. This is exactly what the 
phenomenon of reciprocity would predict: when they learn that others are 
in fact disposed to contribute their fair share, individual taxpayers, just like 
individuals in public good experiments, cooperatively respond in kind. 
Likewise consistent with the reciprocity theory — and at odds with the 
conventional economic one — the Minnesota study found that individuals 
advised of high compliance rates paid more tax than did individuals who 
received letters advising them that their returns would be subject to a 
greater rate of auditing!30  
Another policy that appears to promote trust and hence bolster re-
ciprocal cooperation is the enactment of popular reforms. As the study of 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act demonstrates, such reforms promote the ex-
pression of positive views toward the law. When they are exposed to 
                                                 
27 See Richard D. Schwartz & Soya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274, 
298 (1967). 
28 See Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Percep-
tions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193, 211-13 (J. 
Slemrod ed., 1992). 
29 See id. 













these views, individuals infer that others are inclined to comply. That con-
clusion in turn triggers the disposition to reciprocate in kind. In effect, the 
enactment of popular reforms generates an environment of face-to-face 
assurance giving that builds trust, and a resulting disposition to cooperate, 
in much the same way that discussion does in public goods experiments.  
The contribution that reciprocity makes to tax compliance doesn’t 
imply that the IRS should disavow punishments for evasion altogether. 
That would be foolhardy because of the variability of individual disposi-
tions to cooperate in collective action settings. With no risk of punishment, 
evasion would become commonplace among dedicated cheaters, whose 
defections would in turn unleash a contagious form of demoralization 
among the vast run of reciprocity-minded taxpayers. 
The difference between effective incentives and ineffective ones, 
experimental and other empirical data suggest, lies in the social meanings 
that they express. Enforcers should therefore carefully select cases to 
nourish the perception that evaders are deviants, not normal citizens.31 It 
is already common belief that a certain number of individuals of excep-
tional venality will evade even when nearly all the rest of us are comply-
ing. The existence of coercive incentives understood to be aimed at those 
persons, then, doesn’t dispel trust; on the contrary, it helps to assure the 
honest multitudes that they are not being exploited when they choose to 
pay their taxes. A model case, in this sense, was the tax-fraud prosecu-
tion of hotel-magnate Leona Helmsley, who expressed open contempt for 
income taxes as something that “only the little people pay.”32 
In addition, officials should always juxtapose trust-enhancing infor-
mation with penalties. Auditing crack downs and other high-profile modes 
of enforcement risk backfiring, the evidence suggests, because they func-
tion as a cue that evasion is widespread. To counteract this inference, 
enforcers should be sure that the good news that the vast majority of 
citizens voluntarily comply always gets at least equal billing with the bad 
news that a small minority don’t. They should take advantage of the at-
tention that high-profile prosecutions naturally attract to publicize positive 
information akin to that shown to generate even higher rates of compli-
ance in the Minnesota Tax Experiment. 
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Unfortunately, they often do just the opposite. Competing with other 
agencies and programs for appropriations, the IRS routinely exaggerates 
the inadequacy of its own enforcement powers and the resulting extent of 
evasion.33 Usually timed to be reported on the media the week before 
personal income taxes are due, IRS-generated stories of the agency’s 
own inefficacy in enforcing the law predictably generates resentment in 
those who routinely obey.34 “Are You a Chump?” a Forbes magazine 
cover story asked its tax-paying readers as the magazine reported on the 
supposed decimation of the IRS’ enforcement capacity.35 
The United States, in truth, enjoys a relatively high compliance rate. 
But that hardly means that things can’t be made worse. Like other high-
cooperation equilibria sustained by reciprocity dynamics, the disposition of 
Americans voluntarily to pay their taxes can be “tipped.” If by rattling its 
saber one day and pleading poverty the next, the IRS succeeds in induc-
ing enough taxpayers to believe that cheating is indeed widespread, the 
result could be a self-reinforcing wave of evasion. The result could be a 
new, low-cooperation equilibrium that, as the durability of Europe’s dis-
obedient tax culture attests, can be very difficult to reverse. Ironically, by 
embracing the conventional-theory strategy of “incentives, incentives, and 
more incentives,” the IRS risks making tax compliance into exactly the 
type of intractable collective action problem that the conventional theory 
envisions it to be. 
4. “Not in My Backyard” 
Various types of public facilities — including highways, airports, 
prisons, hazardous waste dumps, and the like — impose disproportionate 
burdens (noise, perceived physical danger, health risks) on persons who 
reside near them. Accordingly, even when they recognize the benefits of 
these facilities for society at large, individuals often resist the siting of 
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them within their own communities, a phenomenon that political scientists 
refer to as the “not in my backyard” phenomenon or “NIMBY.”36 
The conventional theory of collective action sees NIMBY as an-
other expression of individuals’ propensity to withhold costly contributions 
to public goods and instead to free ride on the contributions of others. 
Accordingly, the standard model proposes an incentives-based solution: 
that the communities best-situated to host a particular facility be compen-
sated for the burden associated with it, presumably out of the proceeds of 
a tax imposed on the individuals who benefit from the facility but who 
reside elsewhere.37 
This strategy, however, has an unimpressive track record. In the 20 
years since Massachusetts enacted a widely lauded compensation 
scheme, not a single community has accepted ¾ or been forced to ac-
cept ¾ a facility siting.38 The results have been the same in numerous 
other states and Canadian provinces that have tried to induce siting with 
compensation.39 
Indeed, there is evidence that compensation schemes at least some-
times make the NIMBY problem worse. According to some studies, 
residents often bridle at “compensation offers . . . as attempts to buy 
them off or bribe them.”40 The potential of incentives to backfire in this 
way has been confirmed experimentally by Swiss economists Bruno Frey 
and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, who showed that a compensation offer dra-
matically reduced (from just over 50% to less than 25%) the number of 
laboratory subjects willing to assent to the siting of a nuclear waste stor-
age facility in their community.41 
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It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that compensation 
schemes never work. At least some opinion studies have shown that of-
fers of compensation can significantly increase willingness to accept the 
siting of a noxious facility.42 Moreover, compensation in one form or an-
other has nearly always been a part of the successful waste-facility siting 
efforts in the United States and Canada in recent decades.43 
While failures predominate, it’s fair to conclude that “studies show a 
high degree of variability in the ability of compensation to change public 
opinion” toward siting.44 But precisely because they are not uniformly 
positive, these results furnish little support for the conventional theory’s 
account of NIMBY. Clearly, something more than the weighing of mate-
rial costs and benefits is going on when communities decide whether to 
resist or to accept noxious facilities. 
That something more, opinion analyses suggest, is the moral and 
emotional reaction of residents to siting proposals. Individuals who inter-
pret the decision to impose a site on their community as signifying the low 
social status of its residents — who believe that they are being “dumped 
on,” symbolically as well as literally — are more likely to resist.45 Those 
who distrust government institutions generally also are less likely to tole r-
ate the siting of a noxious facility in their vicinity,46 as are those who be-
lieve that societal benefits and burdens in general, and the burdens asso-
ciated with the facility in question in particular, are being distributed ineq-
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uitably.47 The perception that the racial composition of the community is 
playing a role in that process can create intense opposition in minority 
communities, which historically have been least able to muster the politi-
cal resources necessary to resist forced sitings.48 
These are the sorts of factors that one would expect to influence the 
reactions of individuals who behave like moral and emotional reciproca-
tors with respect to civic obligations. When called upon to accept risks or 
inconveniences in the interest of the public good, individuals who believe 
that societal benefits and burdens are being inequitably distributed by fun-
damentally unjust political institutions unsurprisingly answer, “No.” 
Reciprocal motivations also explain another factor relevant to accep-
tance of toxic waste facilities: the origin of the wastes. A wealth-
maximization model suggests that waste source should be irrelevant: 
home-grown wastes are every bit as hazardous as out-of-town ones. But 
in fact, individuals are much more likely to accept disposal facilities for 
wastes produced locally.49 This makes sense insofar individuals are likely 
to accept a waste disposal facility in a spirit of positive reciprocation 
when they understand the waste to have been generated by beneficial 
local activities. 
The uneven effect of compensation schemes also conforms to the 
logic of reciprocity, which implies that the effect of incentives in dissipat-
ing or promoting trust depends critically on citizens’ moral and emotional 
priors. Imagine a society whose citizens begin with the belief that societal 
burdens are being equitably distributed through a just political process. 
We might expect those individuals, as reciprocators, to be relatively ac-
cepting of the siting of noxious facilities in their community. But if authori-
ties try to purchase acceptance with incentives, these same individuals 
might revise their views, inferring that other communities must in fact be 
unwilling to accept such impositions voluntarily. As a result of this per-
verse cueing effect, the NIMBY phenomenon will grow in strength, as 
individuals reciprocate the perceived resistance to such facilities by 
strengthening their own resistance to them. 
This reaction plausibly expla ins the results in the Frey/Oberholzer-
Gee experiment. Homogeneous, democratic, and small, Switzerland has 
an admirable history of resolving disputes over the allocation of societal 
benefits and burdens through a fair process of deliberative give-and-take. 
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The Swiss subjects in the experiment therefore interpreted the offer of a 
cash payment as evidence that the norm of mutual accommodation had 
broken down in the case of nuclear wastes and became predictably indig-
nant at attempts to buy their assent to a risk that others refused to en-
dure. 
But now imagine the perhaps more typical U.S. or Canadian case of 
a community whose residents start off with the belief that society’s re-
sources are being inequitably  distributed as a result of a fundamentally 
unjust political system. As reciprocators, they are likely to resist the 
nearby siting of a noxious facility. Yet in that climate, there is at least 
some potential for compensation to work: not only does compensation 
help to offset the material inconveniences or risks associated with the 
facility; the very offering of it conveys a degree of respect that previously 
had been lacking in their political life. 
Case studies suggest that this result is most likely when incentives 
are part of a negotiated, “bottom-up” siting regime rather than a centrally 
administered “top-down” one.50 Even with compensation, the imposition 
of a site by a centralized bureaucracy is likely to provoke negative recip-
rocal motivations. The authority of administrators to dictate the site loca-
tion suggests that others are unwilling to accept the facility voluntarily, a 
signal that is reinforced by the need to offer compensation. When volun-
tary acceptance is solicited, however, communities that historically have 
been disadvantaged are likely to feel respected and empowered; compen-
sation is no longer seen as degrading. In addition, the process of negotia-
tion is likely to create a climate akin to the face-to-face discussions in 
public goods games: when they are able to discuss the situation with re-
mote political authorities, and are granted veto power, local communities 
are likely to be assured that others are willing to contribute fair share to 
dealing with the problem. Accordingly, they reciprocate positively by 
showing greater receptivity to placement of the facility. 
These effects, case studies suggest, feed on each other, generating 
multiple behavioral equilibria. Again, in Massachusetts, which enacted a 
top-down, dictate-plus-compensation regime in the 1980s, one community 
after another fought off attempts to site hazardous waste facilities within 
their borders, whereas in Wisconsin, which has a bottom-up, negotiated-
compensation scheme, a succession of communities have come forward 
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to accept such facilities.51 Provinces in Western Canada have had simila r 
strings of successes with the negotiated-compensation strategy.52 
The key to solving NIMBY, in short, is trust. Various sources of 
evidence suggest that individuals can be made receptive to the siting of 
noxious facilities in their communities if they can be made to believe that 
society is committed to treating their interests with respect. Appropriately 
structured bottom-up, negotiated-compensation schemes — ones framed 
to emphasize respect for the interests and autonomy of prospective host 
communities — are one way to reverse deep-seated resentments and 
thus excite a reciprocal openness to siting decisions. If individuals can’t 
be made to believe that the burden of accepting a noxious facility is being 
fairly reciprocated either in kind or by like sacrifices, the current of re-
sentment that fuels NIMBY will be difficult to reverse, even with finan-
cial incentives. 
5. Street Crime  
The conventional theory sees crime prevention as just another col-
lective action problem. As a society, we are all better off when we uni-
versally refrain from theft and like forms of predation. But as individuals, 
each one of us is better off free-riding on whatever restraint our 
neighbors display while engaging in as much looting and pillaging as pos-
sible. Public order is, in short, a public good, one that will always be in 
short supply if individuals are left to their own devices. 
If this is how one thinks of the problem of crime, then the obvious 
solution is to create incentives that bring individual interests into alignment 
with collective ones. Hence, the threat of punishments for those who 
break the law. 
The conventional theory of collective action thus naturally gives rise 
to the law-enforcement strategy of deterrence, which can be neatly for-
malized in terms first proposed by Bentham53 and later refined by 
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Becker.54 As wealth maximizers, individuals, on this theory, commit 
crime when the gain, G, is greater than the expected punishment, which 
is equal to product of the specified penalty, P, and the certainty, C, that it 
will be imposed. Thus, crime is deterred when P x C > G.55 
Of course, it is efficient or collectively wealth-maximizing to deter 
crime only if the social cost of P x C is less than the social losses associ-
ated with the crimes that P x C deters. Accordingly, society must be at-
tentive to the cost of various P x C pairings. This attentiveness generally 
favors severity over certainty, since maintaining a high likelihood of 
detection and conviction (C) requires a continuing investment in police 
officers, judges, prosecutors, public defenders, etc., whereas a high level 
of punishment (P) — assuming it deters and thus doesn’t have to be im-
posed all that often — won’t cost much to implement and will allow soci-
ety to economize on the various components of law enforcement.56 
This turns out to be a fair summary of the guiding philosophy of 
American criminal law enforcement in the last twenty-five years — the 
results of which do little to vindicate the wisdom of the conventional the-
ory. Variance in the severity of punishment has consistently been shown 
to explain little, if any, of the variance in incidences of robbery, burglary, 
homicide, drug dealing and other street crimes across place and time. 
Certainty of conviction makes a difference, although a relatively small 
one.57  
What matters much more are a diverse collection of social condi-
tions and public attitudes. Thus, communities characterized by low “social 
organization” — as measured by the quality and vitality of voluntary civic 
associations — tend to have more crime.58 So do ones in which institu-
tions lack “legitimacy,” as measured by the willingness of individuals to 
view the decisions of law-makers and -enforcers as intrinsically entitled 
                                                 
54 See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. of Pol. Econ. 
169 (1968). 
55 See id. 
56 See id.; Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Crime, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 
(1985). 
57 See generally Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of 
the Twenty-First Century, 23 Crim. & J. 1 (1998). 
58 See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and 












to deference.59 “Social influence” — the tendency of individuals to con-
form their behavior to those around them — also contributes to the inci-
dence of crime, generating multiple crime-rate equilibria independent of 
the expected penalty for law-breaking.60 
Where these factors are conducive to criminality, many individuals 
will break the law notwithstanding very severe penalties. Indeed, there 
is reason to believe that severe penalties can deleteriously affect the atti-
tudes and social conditions that lead to crime: massive incarceration, par-
ticularly when concentrated on minority, inner-city communities, disrupts 
social organization and taxes institutional legitimacy.61 Because it thus 
results in lots of citizens being sent to jail for a long periods of time, the 
conventional deterrence strategy turns out not to be particularly cost-
effective after all — not to mention morally problematic on a host of 
nonutilitarian grounds. 
The contribution that social conditions of this sort make to street 
criminality — and the potentially perverse effect of the classical deter-
rence strategy on these conditions — can be systematized and refined by 
the reciprocity theory. The diverse psychological and social factors that 
predict crime suggest that reciprocity dynamics are at work within not 
just one but rather three interlocking collective action dynamics. The first 
consists in whatever mismatch exists between the interests of society in 
law-abiding behavior and the interests of individuals in committing crime. 
This is the public order collective action problem that occupies the atten-
tion of the conventional theory. The contribution that social influence 
makes to crime suggests that in this collective action setting as in others, 
many individuals behave like reciprocators: that is, they tend to respect 
the security of others in their persons and property in proportion to their 
perception that others are doing the same.62 
The second collective action problem focuses on the collective good 
of community self-policing. Neighborhoods can do a lot to protect them-
selves from crime. Individuals can watch over one another’s residences. 
People can take an interest in the activities of one another’s children, 
alerting parents when they see neighborhood kids veering into trouble or 
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even taking the effort to steer them out of it themselves.63 Individuals can 
make their communities safer just by maintaining a conspicuous presence 
on its sidewalks and streets, especially at night.64 It benefits the commu-
nity collectively when everyone engages in these activities. Yet it remains 
in the interest of each individual to free-ride on the willingness of others 
to monitor, mentor, and simply hang out while attending exclusively to his 
or her own private business, especially where such activities can expose 
those who engage in them to risk or inconvenience. 
The impact of social organization on crime suggests that reciproc-
ity dynamics play a large role in determining how citizens respond to the 
community self-policing dilemma, too. Where they regularly encounter 
each other in voluntary associations — from churches to PTAs, from 
neighborhood improvement organizations to local chambers of commerce 
— citizens are much more likely to observe other individuals contributing 
to common endeavors and thereafter to reciprocate by doing the same. In 
atomized communities, in contrast, individuals are necessarily thrown 
back on their own devices; they are much less likely, in that circum-
stance, to see examples of public -spirited behavior and thus much less 
likely to fall into self-reinforcing patterns of common regard and con-
cern.65 
The third collective action problem hinges on the public good of citi-
zen-police cooperation. The police obviously benefit when citizens co-
operate with them by supplying them with information about crime.66 
Citizens benefit, too, when the police attend diligently to their needs and 
treat them with respect in daily encounters. Yet it will often be in the in-
dividual interest of citizens and police officers not to behave in these 
ways. When individuals report crimes, they expose themselves at a mini-
mum to inconvenience, but also to risk of violent retaliation at the hands 
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of those they reporting.67 Where the law is perceived to be illegitimate, or 
enforcers arbitrary or biased, individuals who cooperate with the police 
are likely to experience personal guilt, or to be stigmatized by other mem-
bers of the community.68 For their part, the police might perceive that 
civilized and polite engagement with private citizens sometimes makes it 
harder for them to ferret out information necessary to solve crimes, or 
even exposes them to physical risk.69 They might also prefer to avoid the 
risks and inconveniences associated with safeguarding private citizens 
from crime. 
Reciprocity dynamics figure largely in a community’s capacity to 
negotiate this collective action problem as well. Citizens are most dis-
posed to cooperate with police when institutions enjoy a high level of le-
gitimacy. Whether institutions are perceived as legitimate, it has been 
shown, is determined largely by whether citizens perceive they are being 
treated in a fair and respectful way by police and other decisionmakers.70 
In effect, citizens reciprocate respectful treatment with cooperation and 
obedience and disrespectful treatment with resistance — not only to the 
directives of individual decisonmakers but to the commands of the law 
more generally.71 How compliant or resistant, deferential or defiant citi-
zens are perceived to be no doubt influences the willingness of the police 
in turn to interact with them in a civil rather than a coercive fashion and 
otherwise respond attentively to their needs.72 
The inefficacy of the conventinal deterrence strategy is a conse-
quence of the effects it has in promoting or inhibiting reciprocal coopera-
tion within these three collective action settings. Considered in isolation, 
the effect of the conventinal deterrence strategy on the public-order 
collective action problem is ambiguous. It’s implausible to think that the 
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threat of punishment has no restraining influence, particularly on individu-
als who for whatever reason are not restrained by the socially inculcated 
dispositions such as shame and guilt.73 At the same time, as the effect of 
high-profile tax auditing campaigns suggests, it seems reasonable to infer 
that conspicuously severe penalties for street crimes might sometimes 
operate as a cue that criminality is in fact wide spread, an inference that 
through reciprocity dynamics would dilute the motivation of some indi-
viduals to respect the rights of others.  
But even assuming that its effect on the public order dilemma is 
positive on the whole, the classical deterrence strategy clearly has a 
negative effect on the community-self-policing and the citizen-police-
cooperation dilemmas. Public law-enforcement and community self-
policing are, economically speaking, substitutes for one another. That is, 
the more a community has of one, the less it needs of the other in order to 
hold crime in check. Accordingly, as the state purports to assume a larger 
share of the deterrence burden through adoption of severe penalties, it 
actually undermines the incentive that individuals have to collaborate 
with each other to safeguard their communities from crime, at least to an 
extent.74 As public enforcement suppresses community self-policing in 
this way, citizens have less occasion to observe one another making con-
spicuous contributions to the safeguarding of their own communities from 
crime. And having less exposure to monitoring, mentoring, creating a 
street presence and so forth, individuals, as reciprocators, become even 
less inclined to engage in such behavior themselves.75 In effect, severe 
penalties, crowd out and mask the disposition of individuals to contribute 
to community self-policing, making it all the more necessary to employ 
severe penalties. 
Severe penalties also discourage individuals from cooperating with 
the police. Such penalties increase the likelihood that the targets of 
reporting will retaliate. Indeed, if severe penalties are used to compensate 
for a low certainty of detection and conviction, most individuals will per-
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ceive that the likelihood of obtaining any benefit from reporting is largely 
futile anyway. In addition, particularly in minority communities, severe 
penalties help to construct the perception that the system is unjust. Ac-
cordingly, it is when the state penalizes criminal-wrongdoing severely that 
individuals are most likely to be inhibited from cooperating out of guilt or 
fear of being branded a collaborator. Confronted with an uncooperative 
citizenry, the police are likely to respond by engaging in heavy-handed 
enforcement, either to compensate for the dearth of private tips, to pro-
tect their own security, or simply to vent their frustration. This behavior 
by the police will in turn provoke citizens to be even less cooperative. 
Deprived of the benefits associated with community support — which 
turns out to be the most potent weapon for combating gangs76 — the 
state will be forced to resort to even more severe penalties, thereby ag-
gravating the citizen-police cooperation problem all the more.77 
Ultimately, the negative effect of the classical deterrence strategy 
on the community-self-policing and citizen-police-cooperation dilemmas 
vitiates whatever positive effect the strategy might have had on the pub-
lic-order dilemma. Convinced that those in the community will not do any-
thing to stop crime, and resentful of a heavy-handed state, individuals are 
likely to respond by engaging in more law-breaking, which then feeds on 
itself as the spectacle of rampant criminality induces others to abandon 
whatever compunction they might have felt not to prey on their neighbors. 
The result is a self-sustaining high crime-rate equilibrium, fueled by dis-
trust and various forms of negative reciprocity. 
Is there a strategy for combating street crime that we should expert 
to work better from a reciprocity point of view?  There is — viz., the se-
lective delegation of law enforcement and punishment functions to net-
works of private anti-crime associations. 
Chicago has implemented a model form of this type of community 
policing. Under CAPS — the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy — 
the Chicago Police Department divided the city’s most crime-ridden 
neighborhoods into a collection of “advisory councils,” which usually 
comprised no more than two or three city blocks. Each council was as-
signed a “beat officer,” who was under strict instructions (at a time when 
the Mayor desperately feared a successful challenge from a minority 
candidate) to translate the counsel’s grievances into an agenda of prob-
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lems to be solved by policing strategies acceptable to community resi-
dents.78 
The strategies that turned out to be the most acceptable involved the 
selective privatization of a variety of law-enforcement tasks.  One of 
these was order-maintenance policing. In events dubbed “Operation Beat 
Feet,” “March for Peace,” and “Good Guys Loitering,” the advisory 
councils organized large numbers of law-abiding citizens to occupy the 
streets of disorderly neighborhoods. By establishing a “positive people 
presence,” these citizens transformed those neighborhoods into law-
abiding ones during hours when they otherwise might have been expected 
to be the center of criminal activity.79 
CAPS also privatized criminal investigations. At advisory council 
“beat meetings,” citizens frequently complained of sources of disorder 
that the police lacked the resources to investigate. When this happened, 
the citizens themselves were encouraged to gather the evidence neces-
sary to obtain legal relief. Thus, on one occasion citizens facilitated the 
closure of a noisy tavern, which attracted disorderly patrons, by furnishing 
evidence of chronic  health-code violations. On another, citizens contrib-
uted to the jailing of a slumlord, whose rundown tenement had become 
the site of drug-dealing and gang activity, by collecting evidence of “reck-
less disregard” for public safety.80 
Finally, CAPS facilitated instances of private shaming. One of these 
involved a two-year picketing campaign, in which homeowners demon-
strated outside the home of a slumlord who had allowed his properties to 
become the sites of deadly gang activity. The demonstrators “were fed 
up with the noise, crime, violence and general unrest that stemmed from 
the problem buildings . . . . They hoped they could make the building 
owner as uncomfortable in his home as he was making them in theirs.”81 
This form of highly participatory and decentralized law enforcement 
proved to be as successful as it was unorthodox. Examining crime and 
opinion data, criminologists Wesley Skogan and Susan Hartnett have con-
cluded that in the neighborhoods in which CAPS operated trust in the po-
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lice grew significantly, as did trust among neighbors. All forms of street 
crime — from drug distribution to robbery to homicide — dropped.82 
The behavioral mechanisms at work can again be explained in recip-
rocity terms. In effect, CAPS, promoted trust, and hence reciprocal co-
operation, within each of the three collective action settings that construct 
the problem of street crime. To begin, CAPS had a positive effect on the 
community-self-policing dilemma. Whereas traditional policing strategies 
risk displacing community self-policing, CAPS assigned certain, highly 
conspicuous elements of law-enforcement to community residents them-
selves. As they observed their neighbors attending and speaking up at 
council meetings, and thereafter participating in order-maintenance dem-
onstrations, public shamings, and the like, citizens learned that in fact their 
neighbors were willing to take an active role in safeguarding their com-
munity from crime. Those who formed this impression could thereafter 
have been expected to reciprocate, either by participating in CAPS initia-
tives or by entering into less formal arrangements to watch out for one 
another’s interests. 
The CAPS approach to community policing also helped to promote 
positive reciprocity within citizen-police-cooperation setting. Citizens long 
accustomed to seeing the police as simultaneously indifferent to their 
needs and disrespectful of their rights now were exposed to highly re-
sponsive and solicitous officers. Unsurprisingly, citizens grew more trust-
ful and thus more willing to cooperate with the police. In addition, CAPS 
made it easier to cooperate with the police by negating social meanings 
that can make such behavior an occasion for guilt or ostracism: those 
who took part in CAPS were not likely to view themselves or to be 
viewed by others as turning their fellow citizens over to an alien or occu-
pying force; rather they were participating in forms of self-governance 
visibly supported by other members of the community. The police, too, no 
doubt reciprocated the greater willingness of citizens to cooperate with 
them by treating citizens more respectfully in return, thereby generating 
an even greater willingness among citizens to cooperate with the police. 
Because it had these effects on the community-self-policing and citi-
zen-police-cooperation problems, CAPS likely had a positive effect on the 
public-order dilemma as well. In a climate in which they trusted each 
other and the state more, individuals are more likely to obey the law. And 
through reciprocity dynamics, such obedience feeds on itself. 
The reciprocity theory explains why we should expect selective pri-
vatization to result in a self-sustaining high-cooperation, low-crime equilib-
                                                 












rium. And it implies that this equilibrium is likely to be a stable and lasting 
one. 
6. Other Applications  
The reciprocity theory has implications for a broad range of policy 
problems in addition to tax collection and the siting of noxious facilities. 
It’s possible to sketch several in broad outline. 
Fraud and Corruption 
Like the disposition of individuals to engage in tax evasion, the dispo-
sition of individuals to engage in fraud or corruption appears to depend on 
whether they think other individuals are engaged in such behavior.83 This 
implies that high-profile campaigns to crackdown on such behavior, like 
high-profile crackdowns on tax evasion, can backfire.84 Indeed, when 
government invests more to deter fraud, individuals have less incentive to 
invest in credibly signaling to others that they are trustworthy and honest, 
and hence reliable as trade partners. Because individuals reciprocate hon-
esty with honesty, the suppression of individuals efforts to display honesty 
to others will predictably reduce the disposition of individuals to behave 
honestly, thus making penalties for dishonesty less effective. A better 
policy, again, is to make citizens aware that those around them are 
basically honest. 
Or at least that is the best policy where individuals are in fact gener-
ally honest. In a condition of pervasive distrust — such as that which ob-
tains in many former Eastern block nations — strong penalties for fraud 
and dishonesty may be the only thing that works. Moreover, in such a 
climate, penalties for dishonesty may in fact promote rather than under-
mine trust. Individuals who resent fraud and corruption are likely to inter-
pret the advent of credible penalties as evidence that others around them 
now feel the same way and are prepared to do something about it. Some 
of those individuals will be moved to reciprocate by behaving more hon-
estly themselves, inducing still others to do the same, and so forth and so 
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on, until a new condition of self-reinforcing cooperation is reached — at 
which point maintenance of high penalties may be less necessary.85 
Information and Technology 
Ideas are understood to be a classic public good. We all benefit from 
useful inventions, engaging works of literature, effective medicines for 
disease, and the like. But why should any one of us endure the cost asso-
ciated with producing them when we can freely avail ourselves of the 
inventive labors borne by others? The conventional theory again resorts to 
incentives, here in the form of intellectual property rights that permit in-
ventors to exclude others from use of their ideas absent the payment of a 
fee.86 
But reciprocity once more complicates the picture. A growing body 
of work has documented that within certain fields — including basic sci-
entific research and many types of computer software development — 
individuals will reciprocate spontaneous contributions to a collaborative 
inventive enterprise with like contributions of their own, generating inno-
vations that rival and often surpass the quality of those achieved through 
proprietary modes of production.87 Where this is so, the deadweight 
losses and administrative costs inevitably associated with intellectual 
property rights needn’t be endured to secure the public benefits of inven-
tion. Indeed, university scientists, computer hackers, and other reciprocal 
producers tend to suspend the free exchange of ideas once they come to 
suspect that those with whom they are collaborating are intent on appro-
priating the commercial value of those innovations for themselves.88 An 
intellectual property regime that is insensitive to the contribution that re-
ciprocity norms make to invention can thus stifle rather than stimulate 
innovation. 
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The application of the conventional model of collective action to de-
mocratic politics yields public choice theory. According to that theory, 
citizens, because they are self-interested wealth maximizers, will forego 
public spirited deliberation and instead organize themselves into interest 
groups for the purpose of extracting rents.89 To combat this dynamic, 
policy analysts have proposed a wide variety of structural devices — 
from campaign finance laws90 to term limits91 to line item vetoes92 to 
budget process reforms93 — all of which seek to raise the cost or reduce 
the benefits of organizing into special-interest pressure groups. 
The reciprocity model suggests a different analysis. As a positive 
matter, it points to a substantial body of empirical research suggesting that 
the behavior of elected representatives is limited by informal norms that 
discourage unconstrained efforts to redirect public resources toward 
one’s own constituencies.94 Thus, reciprocity dynamics already make at 
least some contribution to containing special-interest politics. 
As a prescriptive matter, the reciprocity model warns us not to as-
sume that structural reforms will invariably reinforce reciprocity norms in 
this setting. Policies designed to counteract public choice pressures do 
more than change political actors’ incentives to engage in rent-seeking; 
they also broadcast to citizens and their representatives that rent-seeking 
is the behavior we expect political actors to engage in whenever it is in 
their interest to do so. Because individuals are reciprocators, they are 
likely to respond to this message by displaying even less restraint in the 
pursuit of their material interests in democratic political life. Thus, reforms 
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aimed at reducing incentives to behave in a self-interested fashion might 
well dissipate reciprocity-based norms that now hold such behavior at 
least partially in check, and thereby increase special-interest rent-seeking 
on net. The reciprocity model thus underscores the anxiety that too read-
ily accepting the public choice picture can make it the reality of our po-
litical life.95 
At the same time, however, the reciprocity model underscores how 
reforms that reflect different assumptions might stimulate public spirited-
ness. For example, scholars have proposed that the state award citizens 
two types of monetary grants: “stakes” that they can use as they see fit 
upon adulthood, and “patriot dollars” that they can contribute to the politi-
cal campaigns of their choice.96 The first of these expresses a societal 
commitment to assuring individuals a fair chance to realize their life plans, 
the second its commitment to assuring them a fair chance to influence the 
political process, irrespective of their personal wealth. It’s plausible to 
believe that many citizens will reciprocate the good will embodied in these 
schemes by contributing more readily to the well-being of society and by 
refraining from purely self-seeking political behavior. And when they ob-
serve public-spirited behavior of this sort, still more citizens will be moved 
to behave in the same way. These proposals, then, are another example 
of how appropriately expressive law — even in the form of cash subsi-
dies — can be expected to accentuate reciprocal cooperation. 
Good Samaritanism 
Breaking with the traditional Anglo-American position, several states 
have in recent years enacted laws that oblige individuals to assist strang-
ers in need when they can do so without risk to themselves. Such laws 
are intended to counter the supposed growing indifference of Americans 
— particularly urban-dwelling ones — toward the well-being of strang-
ers.97 
But the reciprocity theory warns that such laws may do more to 
construct than to remedy such indifference. Some individuals will see the 
apparent necessity of a penalty for nonassistance as confirmation that 
most citizens don’t genuinely care about strangers’ well-being; those indi-
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viduals, the reciprocity model predicts, will respond by showing less con-
cern themselves. Financial incentives to assist are also likely to obscure 
morally motivated acts of assistance, thereby diluting a signal of good 
intentions that would otherwise have moved individuals to reciprocate in 
kind. 
Substantial experimental evidence suggests that it simply is not the 
case that Americans are disinclined to render assistance to strangers in 
need.98 The way to strengthen citizens’ resolve to render such assis-
tance, the reciprocity theory implies, is to correct the misperception that 
others lack such resolve, a goal that can be achieved through public 
commendations of individuals who engage in heroic behavior. 
7. Conclusion 
The main — indeed, only — selling point of the conventional theory 
of collective action is its asserted behavioral realism. Individuals, it tells 
us, are inherently self-seeking. Accordingly, we can’t count on them vol-
untarily to subordinate their material interests to the good of society; 
rather we must alternately bribe and threaten them through a costly regu-
latory apparatus, the maintenance of which not only depletes our common 
resources but itself creates myriad opportunities for advantage-seeking by 
self-interested individuals and groups. It is hard to imagine a less inspiring 
account of our motives and our prospects. But if the ugly picture the con-
ventional theory paints is right, then we’d be fools to avert our eyes from 
it. 
It turns out, however, that the conventional theory isn’t right. Indi-
viduals in collective action settings might not behave like saints, but they 
don’t behave like fiends either. They can be counted on to contribute to 
collective goods, the emerging literature on reciprocity shows, so long as 
they perceive that others are inclined to do the same . Bribes and 
threats are not nearly so necessary as the conventional theory would 
have us believe; the law can instead enlist our cooperation by furnishing 
us with grounds to trust one another to contribute our fair share to soci-
ety’s needs. Indeed, when the law relies only on bribes and threats, it 
breeds the impression that citizens can’t trust one another to contribute to 
collective goods voluntarily, thereby undermining their motivation to recip-
rocate one another’s public spiritedness. Whatever truth there is in the 
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conventional theory is an artifact of the common acceptance of that the-
ory’s bleak assumptions. 
So we should now reject them. To replace the conventional theory 
of collective action, we should construct a new and more appealing one 
founded on our nature as reciprocators. The logic of reciprocity not only 
reflects a more realistic understanding of individual emotional and moral 
commitments. It makes the hope that citizens will be morally and emo-
tionally committed to contribute to the common good more realistic. 
 
 
 
